Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the emergence of independent Chinese automobile manufacturers (ICAMs) and International Technology Transfer. Many scholars indicate that the use of outside supplies is the sole reason for the high-speed growth of ICAMs. However, it is necessary to outline the reasons and factors that might contribute to the process at the company-level. This paper is based on the organizational view. It examines and clarifies the internal dynamics of the ICAMs from a historical perspective.
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate the chaotic but progressive emergence of independent Chinese automobile manufacturers (ICAMs). It will also provide an academic view of the relationship between To answer these questions, this paper was divided into three parts. First, we distinguish between independent and non-independent Chinese automakers. We elaborate on the background and origin of ICAMs and outline the key factors that affected their emergence, especially in the passenger vehicle market. Although new entrants were banned by the industrial policy a few years after the implementation of the Auto Industry Policy (1994), annual sales are still comparable to those of Sino-foreign joint venture companies (see Table 1 ).
The word "independent" seems to mean 5 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 26 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total Basic passenger car As a result, in the early 1990s, the Chinese automobile market was an oligopoly, led by a few authorized players and strictly protected by both industrial policy and high import duties. All the authorized players intended to raise productivity through joint ventures with foreign corporations. This import substitution policy met with partial success. However, the price of products made by 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Billion RMB 0 3000 6000 9000 1200 1500 RMB per capita GDP per capita GDP these joint ventures was higher than levels in the rest of the world, and much higher than the income levels of the normal Chinese household (see Table 2 ).
For this reason, in the early 1990s, automobile demand was mainly supported by state officials and state-owned companies, not by households. The high price of vehicles was the largest constraint on household demand. The average price of most vehicles was higher than RMB 130,000, which was more than 20 times the GDP per capita in 1997. In addition, the smuggling in of passenger vehicles in the 1990s greatly exceeded legal import (see Figure   3 ).
Generally speaking, the motorization of a country is quite smooth after its GDP per capita surpasses US$ 1,000. After 1994, the Chinese GDP and GDP per capita experienced rapid growth (see In the middle of the year 2000, when the Chinese GDP per capita was close to the US$ 1,000 mark, the government and most joint venture automakers started to focus on the production of "family cars"
(or "public cars"). Many automakers planned to promote products specified as "family cars," worth RMB 100,000, to influence motorization in China. However, in 2001, the income levels of Chinese households still were low, and motorization became possible only in some advanced areas like Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (see Table 3 ).
Foreign companies were not the only ones to recognize the opportunities in the Chinese market in the late 1990s; Chinese domestic companies recognized them as well. In the 1990s, the high rate of profits in the passenger vehicle industry attracted domestic companies that had potential capabilities (see Figure 5) . Additionally, the high price of the joint venture products and the high potential demand from households gave domestic producers the best opportunity to enter the segment of vehicles priced under RMB 100,000, which joint venture automakers did not intend to enter (see Table 3 ). and Geely, has expanded rapidly (see Figure 1 ). 4,000 people) of whom were engineers, and 1,500 of whom were directly related to R&D (see Table 6 ). Table 7 ). Table 8 ).
First, we should mention that it is impossible to distinguish clearly the positive and negative effects of international technology transfer. As a result, Table 8 is based only on empirical analysis. Table 8 ) to improve its technological capabilities in R&D and manufacturing.
In conclusion, even though international technology transfer (as an important external factor) had a number of positive effects on the development of ICAMs development, the building of managerial capabilities and system integration (as an internal factor) became the main aim of all ICAMs. 
